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HISTORY AND CHALLENGES OF INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Inter-governmental relations encapsulate the full amplitude of interactions among governmental authorities who share responsibility for governance with the aim of minimizing jurisdictional conflicts, competition and confrontation in governance especially in a federal system. When in operation, the term connotes vertical and horizontal, formal and informal, conflictual and cooperative patterns of relationships that take place among different levels of government in a political system. Nigeria's experiences of this paramount cornerstone of federalism have been unwieldy. While it cannot be denied that the country has a record of remarkable areas of workable interactions among her different governmental authorities, most of the hiccups in such

relationships especially since her independence in 1960 leaves an awkward taste for commentary. The country's political evolution was constantly interjected by military rule and numerous constitutional changes and this scenario impeded the development of a culture of relationship among the levels of government. This paper attempts to interrogate the history of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria and the very challenges that bedevil its optimal implementation.

Introduction

The Nigerian state is faced with a number of challenges which has had both political and socio-economic implications. These socio-economic and even political problems have been explained within the context of a number of factors ranging from national ethnic diversity or 'cultural plurality,' unequal resource endowment, weak institutions, corruption, violent native-settler conflict, rent-seeking and mono-cultural economic base, epochal impact of prolonged military rule, absence of infrastructure and dependence on more developed countries, among others. In addition, a major factor in the quest for socio-economic and even political advancement of the Nigerian state has been hinged on its federal governmental structure. It is within this milieu that calls for "25%, 15%, 50%, etc derivation," "resource control," "state police," "sovereign national conference," "secession," "political *Sharia*," and "Biafra" among others, can be located. This scenario is even made more complicated by narratives that foresee the balkanisation of the federation (Yaqub, 2006: 20).

It is within this context that intergovernmental relations (IGR) in Nigeria have also been faced with a number of challenges. Some of the aforementioned problems could be explained in terms of the failure of IGR since a federation implies levels of government where each has responsibilities and capacities to function, or not function as the case may be. In the Nigerian context, the federation is made up of a federal government, 36 state government, a federal capital territory,

and 774 local governments. Against this background, this paper essentially aims to address itself to three critical questions in an attempt to situate the challenges of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria. First; what is IGR and what are its ramifications, patterns or perspectives? Second, what is the history of IGR in Nigeria? Third, what are the fundamental challenges facing IGR in Nigeria? To answer these questions, the paper is divided into five parts: an introduction that flows into a conceptual clarification of IGR, an attempt to trace the history of IGR, identification of IGR challenges in Nigeria.

Intergovernmental Relations: A Conceptual Clarification

It must be pointed out that IGR does not have a universally accepted definition as its understanding and representations are shrouded in multiple usages. But in spite of this multiplicity of interpretations and perspectives, IGR has been viewed as a course in an academic discipline, as a concept, an instrument and as a process. As a part of a discipline, it is one of the numerous subfields or courses under Public Administration or Policy Studies that essentially studies the relationship between various arms and levels of government. Some institutions such as the University of Ibadan refer to it as *Decentralisation and Intergovernmental Relations Administrative Systems*. As a concept, IGR speaks to the interconnections among arms and levels of government. These interconnections particularly in a federal system, include, but is not limited to, those pattern of IGR transactions between federal-state, federal-local, federal-civic groups, state-state, state-local, state-civic groups, local-local, local-civic groups, inter-civic groups (Oladeji, 2005).

As an instrument, IGR is a means to an end. By this, it is a means to achieve governmental goals. Timothy Layman in a report for the South African Presidency in 2003 aptly puts it thus:

The object of intergovernmental relations is to manage... tension - to get coherent government that delivers services to the nation through the three spheres of government. In other words,

intergovernmental relations are not an end in themselves, but a means for marshalling the distinctive effort, capacity, leadership and resources of each sphere and directing these as effectively as possible towards the developmental and service delivery objectives of government as a whole. Intergovernmental relations in our country have this developmental character (Layman, 2003: 10).

The instrumentalist view of IGR is such that “object of intergovernmental relations is to establish a system in which all of spheres of government plan together to provide a coherent approach to service delivery and development” (Ibid: 15). It is therefore in this context that Cameron (2001: 121) describes IGR as “the work-horse of any federal system: it is the privileged instrument by which the job- whatever the job- gets done” (cited in Aiyide, 2004: 27).

As a process or network of actions, IGR covers the whole gamut of actions, inactions and even reactions by actors or group of actors in one arm or level of government towards other actors or group of actors in another arm or level of government. By this, IGR is viewed as a continuous interaction among bodies (whether executive, legislature and the judiciary between level such as federal, state and local government). These interactions are such that “as an organizational unit, all the three bodies work together and cooperate but sometimes, overlap in their functions” (Akiri, 2006: 16) while conflict is not ruled out (Ekpo, 2004: 33-34).

Having said this, William Anderson who is renowned for introducing IGR defines it as “an important body of activities or intentions occurring between (or among) governmental units of all types and levels within the United States federal system” (cited in Aiyide, 2004: 27). Thus, not only does he argue that IGR is only peculiar to federal systems but most importantly, it goes beyond being a body of activities but also encompasses *intentions* as the case maybe. Yet Ladipo Adamolekun (2005: 60) views it as “the interaction between the different levels of government within a

state." This goes along with Olujimi's (1989: 113) position that IGR remains a "system of transaction (behaviour patterns) among managers of hierarchically structured levels of government in a state."

It must also be pointed out, as Nyemutu Roberts (1999: 60) notes, that IGR could be vertical or horizontal. By being vertical, it refers to those interactions that take place between the central government and the states or localities, or when the states interact with the localities. On the other hand, by being horizontal, IGR encompasses those interactions between governments at the same level in the political structure such as inter-state or inter-localities interactions. Thus, some of the major features of IGR include the following: it involves all government units (central or federal, state and local); it covers actions of officials and their attitudes: purposeful behaviour, perception of other participants in the system; it covers regular interactions among officials (such as day-to-day contacts, practical working relationship and continuity of action patterns); it involves all public officials (elected and appointed); and it focuses on policy issues which are chiefly on finances (intergovernmental revenue and expenditures; borrowing and debt), policy formulation and implementation, policy content (distributive, regulatory and redistributive issues) (Roberts, 1999: 60).

It must also be added that Deil Wright (1988) identifies three models of IGR: Coordinate (or Separated) Authority, Inclusive Authority and Overlapping Authority Models. These models are diagrammatically represented as below:

Characteristics	Coordinate Authority Model (Classical Federalism)	Inclusive Authority Model (Centralising Federalism)	Overlapping Authority Model (Cooperative Federalism)
Constitutional Status	1. National and state governments are created by the constitution and derive their powers from there from. 2. Local governments are usually created by the states. Dillons Rule applies. ¹	1. Constitution may or may not allocate powers to levels of government. (Does not matter).	1. Constitution defines areas of autonomous action by respective jurisdictions (national, state and local).
Nature of Power Relations	1. Relationship between two coequal government units distinctly separated. Supreme Court serves as arbiter. 2. National-state relations is relatively modest. The two levels are only tangentially linked. 3. Power of the two levels are exercised in a separate, independent and autonomous fashion.	1. State and local governments are subordinate to national government. And they cannot challenge the centre. 2. There is a dependency relations where the overall power pattern is similar to Dillons Rule.	1. Interactions among three coequal levels of government: national, state and local. 2. Relations is governed by constitution. Each unit can defend its constitutional powers. 3. Limited and dispersed power.
Authority Pattern	1. Autonomy (minimal or nil local government autonomy).	1. Hierarchy (no sphere of state autonomy outside national control and no sphere of local autonomy outside state control).	1. Interlocking, interdependent, balanced and bargaining (negotiation of the terms of exchange or agreement). 2. Substantial areas of governmental operations involve national, state and local officials simultaneously. 3. High degree of potential or actual independence. Modest and uncertain areas of autonomy.

Source: An adaptation of Nyemutu Roberts (1999: 62).

At this juncture, and in the Nigerian context, IGR have been faced with a number of challenges but before proceeding to discuss some of these challenges, it is pertinent to attempt to trace the history of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria. What is the history of IGR in Nigeria?

History and Chronology of IGR in Nigeria

In historicizing IGR in Nigeria, three critical understandings are required and must be stressed. First, the history of IGR is not mutually exclusive from the historical trajectory of the Nigerian state as challenges facing the state in terms of its economy and politics

often find resonance in, and in fact coursed by, jaundiced IGR. Second, and an extension of the aforementioned point, is that IGR had manifested the 3Cs of social relations in which case relations had been a mix of conflict, cooperation and competition. Third, and as Roberts (1999) notes, IGR in Nigeria has oscillated between the aforementioned three models owing to the changes in form of government from military to civilian, changes in composition and power of constituent units of the federation, and changes in the fiscal fortunes of the nation.

With this realisation, IGR in Nigeria dates back to the colonial era especially with the 1914 amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates. By this arrangement, areas, that were to a large extent under different 'governments' were united in such a way that set a foundation for exchanges and intergovernmental engagements. But initially, IGR were somewhat minimal as the 1914 unification meant nothing but a representation of British interest where funds from the South were used to clear expenditures in the North, though some argue that the Northern government were not dependent on the Southern Region in real terms but that revenue was gotten from the South to prosecute and complete the war against those Northern states that were yet to be officially brought under British control in the area referred to as the Northern Protectorate (Usman, 2005). Yet the South and North were separately administered. This limited contact between the South and North, especially after Sir Lord Lugard left in 1916, is buttressed by Akinboye and Anifowose (1999: 239) thus:

... the Governor who alone possessed executive power and acted on his own discretion. Although there was only one Governor for the whole territory, different policies and concepts of colonial administration were maintained by both the North and South.

At the central-protectorate level, British colonialism dictates that decisions and actions of the central colonial governments were not subjected to inputs of the component protectorates. It must also be

added that the Legislative Council was limited to the colony and the Southern Protectorate while the Governor was vested with legislative power in respect of the North. The Richards Constitution of 1946 succeeded in balkanising the country into three regions (Northern, Western and Eastern Regions) and established Regional Houses of Assembly and House of Chiefs. The Western and Eastern Regions had unicameral legislature (Regional Houses of Assembly) while the North had both the Regional House of Assembly and House of Chiefs. The powers of these legislative authorities were limited in scope and even subject to the central colonial authority. The agitation for more responsibilities gained expression in the multiplicity of constitutions (i.e. Macpherson's Constitution of 1951 which formalised federalism in Nigeria, Lyttleton's Constitution of 1954, and eventually the 1963 Republican Constitution). Thus, colonial Nigeria was mainly based on an Inclusive Authority IGR Model where regions cannot challenge the centre. In addition, IGR was also affected by the ethno-centric politics of the time to an extent that, few years to independence in 1960, though regional governments had begun to exact their powers to self-determination, mutual suspicion had meant that both the Western and Eastern Regions attained self-government on August 8, 1957 while the Northern Region opted for a later 1959. This schism was further accentuated by ethno-centric parties that dominated regional politics and government, and pursued ethno-centric agendas. In the context of this last point, IGR was somewhat coordinate.

At independence in 1960, Nigeria still had three regions: North, West and East. At that point, the regions operated a somewhat Coordinate Model of IGR in which case the regions operated within their own autonomy without any serious interference from the central government except in cases of violent conflict as was in the Western part of Nigeria where the Federal Government had to not only place a state of emergency following the 1965 Western Regional election or in cases of revenue sharing which was also based on derivation. But, as in the immediate post-independence period, the relations of the various levels of government were engulfed in the general ethnic

coloration of the day's polity which not only manifested in ethno-regional parties that had ethnic agendas and drew their governments along same lines, but also witnessed an arrangement where revenue allocation was still mainly based on derivation.

The federal government had, partly because of political reasons and partly because of minority agitation, created a Mid-Western Region in 1963 from the Western Region. However, ethnicity among other factors ultimately led to a military coup that returned Maj. Gen. Aguiyi Ironsi as Head of State and Government in 1966. Apart from the fact that military regimes generally tend to centralise power in the spirit of Puritanism and maintaining law and order, Ironsi further promulgated Decree 34 which abolished the federal system of government and substituted it with a unitary system which de-recognises the four existing regions "and divided the country into provinces for the purposes of governance" (Akinboye and Anifowose, 1999: 249).

After Ironsi's demise in a bloody counter-coup that returned Maj. Yakubu Gowon, the country was returned to a federal system and further divided into 12 states in a bid to check the secessionist Eastern/Biafra Region in 1967. Eventually, a Civil War (1967-1970) broke out between the federal and Eastern governments or Biafra Region led by Col. Emeka Ojukwu. This marked the highest point of conflict between federal-regional governments in Nigeria's history and was eventually a major reason for Nigeria's centralised federalism. The aftermath of the War led to the federal government initiating Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation (3Rs) policy in an attempt to ease tension between it and the Eastern region. But beyond the civil war, IGR under the military was centralised in which case interaction and engagement between the central and component units were determined and shaped by the top (i.e. federal government's/ military hegemons) while the states which also are made up of military administrator tend, by fact of their appointment, to be submissive. It must however be pointed out that military rule created most of the states that today makes up the Nigerian federation: 12 in 1967, 19 in 1976, 21 in 1987, 30 in 1991 and 36 in

1996.

However, in spite of the above, two actions were taken that had implications for IGR. First, a number of commissions on revenue sharing among the federal government and its component units were set up. Second, actions were taken concerning the local government tier especially in terms of the 1976 Local Government Reform which officially recognised them as a third level of governmental activities. The brief civilian administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari could not however adequately check the challenge of over-centralisation of power in the federal government nor rupture the ethno-centric bases of component units. Third, platforms for IGR such as Supreme Courts, statutory bodies, ad hoc bodies emerged and boosted the potentials for cooperative IGR.

Thus, this pattern of IGR had continued till May 29, 1999 when the military decided to hand over power to the civilian administration. And perhaps realising the challenges of IGR, President Olusegun Obasanjo had on July 27, 1999 in a joint session of the National Assembly called for the enthronement of "cooperative federalism" (Roberts, 1999: 56) which by implication means a cooperative relations between the centre and states governments. It must however be stressed that IGR in Nigeria has advanced from a mere central and three regions engagement in 1960 to one that at least (constitutionally) have 812 (one central government, 36 states, a federal capital and 774 local governments) government units since 1999. Yet, a number of issues have continued to form the core of IGR challenges even in the Fourth Republic. These challenges have ranged from a mere conflict among two levels or arms of government to serious conflict among component groups in which case "the stability of the Fourth Republic could be consolidated or compromised depending on the dynamics of IGR" (Ibid: 57).

The essence of the division of powers in a federal setting is to ensure that the component units are independent and coordinated. It is expected that when two or more levels of government are recognised as legitimate within the same polity. They are bound to

interact in many ways; some conflictual, some cooperative. To avoid dangerous competitions and destructive contacts, regularized patterns or interactions and relations must be established to ensure harmonious existence. In Nigeria's case, the established ad-hoc processes to harmonise the interests of the various levels of governments give to intergovernmental relations. The objective of Nigeria's intergovernmental relations includes the following:

1. To promote peace and harmony among the three tiers of government in the country.
2. To enhance the emergence of cooperative rather than competitive federalism.
3. To ensure effective and efficient utilization of available human and material resources among the various levels of government.
4. To accelerate the achievement of a self-reliant economy.
5. To minimize the intergovernmental conflicts among the various tiers of government.
6. To solve the problem of rural-urban poverty, ignorance and suffering of the people.
7. To foster greater national integration through the activities of the three levels of government.
8. To promote natural development in all sectors of the economy.

Challenges of IGR in Nigeria

This paper recognises that the challenges facing intergovernmental relations are multidimensional and numerous with scholars hammering on areas they consider pertinent. For instance, while Aiyede (2004) locates these challenges within institutional and constitutional contexts, Bambose (2008) hammers on IGR as it is being affected by political opposition. Benjamin (2004) looks at challenges in federal-state relations while Egwaikhaide (2004) and Ekpo (2004) both look at the challenges of IGR in terms of fiscal relations. Roberts (1999) investigates the lapses of the 1999 Constitution and the implications for IGR while Eminue (1995) locates his argument on the "myth" of Local Government. Similar,

the challenges facing IGR in Nigeria could also be engaged in terms of three aspects of IGR as represented by the fiscal, the attitudinal and the legal aspects.

However, in identifying these challenges a number of questions might surface. For instance, should challenges facing IGR be seen from the point of view of individual relations between levels of government or should they be located in group terms where the components of IGR are situated in terms of their role and membership of a *collective*. Or is there any possibility of a synergy between the challenges of IGR in one situation and other situations? If yes, would it not, therefore, be more sensible to locate these challenges in terms of networks or systems of IGR? Though these questions points to, or at least suggests, the possibility of varied perspectives of locating IGR challenges, this paper broadly locates the major challenges facing IGR in Nigeria at three interrelated and overlapping levels: individual levels, group levels and system levels.

I. Individual level challenge:

By the individual level, this speaks to those challenges that relate to just two actors in the whole gamut of IGR. Since IGR is at least a relationship between two arms or levels of government, this could for instance involve the relations between a state and the federal government or a state and a local government, or a state and another state. The underlining feature being that this level of challenges is located on the basis of one-on-one. At this level, IGR has been problematic in terms of political, among other, differences. This challenge is often pronounced when there is party difference or if there is a clash in the personality of the leaders of a level of government or where there are differing interests. For instance, the second four years of Governor Bola Ahmed Tinubu of Lagos State witnessed a conflictive relations with the Olusegun Obasanjo led federal government to an extent that council funds were not released to the federal government in spite of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court that the said funds be released. The case of clash between the federal and the Abia State government is also a case

in point where politics went a long way to affect IGR. Another example of the manifestation of this level of challenges was the division between federal government and the Plateau state government over the 2008 Jos crisis. At the height of the conflict, both had setup different probe panels Maj-Gen. Emmanuel Abisoye (rtd) and Prince Bola Ajibola panels respectively.

Ultimately, political differences tends to breed unhealthy infrastructural contestations and infrastructural determinism in which case the former speaks to the issue of competition for ownership and control of infrastructure while the latter speaks to assertion of ownership. This challenge, which is located in an instrumentalist view of inter-governmental relations, has continued to affect service delivery to Nigerians. As noted by Solomon Benjamin, road constructions or maintenance, power generation and supply, land acquisition, security matters and environmental issues often get engulfed in federal-state contestations (Benjamin, 2004: 93). This is further complicated, as noted by Benjamin, when there is "lack of inter-party cooperation and the dictatorial tendencies of those in the helm of affairs" (Ibid). In Lagos State for instance, during the administration of Senator Bola Ahmed Tinubu, it was not uncommon for road users to see signs of "This Road Belong to the Federal Government, Please Bear With Us!" Similarly, the federal administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo had frustrated the Lagos State administration of Bola Tinubu when the latter wanted to initiate its power project.

II. Group level challenges

The group level challenge of IGR speaks to those challenges that revolve around more than two actors (levels, arms or agencies of government) in IGR. This is often a manifestation of group held positions in which case IGR is an avenue for "we" versus "them" posture. A ready example of this is located in the agitation of the Niger Delta states. The call for a better bargain for Niger Delta states have resulted in a number of cries chief of which is resource control. The quest for resource control is such that a number of these states

have increasingly championed the call for control of their resources while taxes should be sent to the federal government. They question the shift away from derivation as a principle since the discovery of crude oil and its environmental implications. (Ekong-Bassey, 2006, 156) This call however has an implication for other poor and non-oil producing states because the rent-seeking nature of the Nigerian economy has witnessed the institutionalisation of laziness where there is over-reliance on crude oil revenue. It is in this context that the federal government initiated the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to attend to some of the developmental challenges of the region that the defunct Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) could not surpass. (Ibid, 150)

The group challenge can also be located in terms of the challenge of national integration. In other words, the overbearing question of nation-ethnicity struggle still remains and have sometimes not only permeated IGR but has also impacted on the nature of IGR. It is within this context that the introduction of *Sharia*, calls for resource control and state police has been given ethnic or sectional interpretations among states. It must however be pointed out that the individual and group challenges find ultimate expression in the systems level challenges.

III. System level challenges

The systemic challenges are those that find expression in majority or the whole actors of IGR. It covers issues of revenue allocation, Federal Government over-concentration of powers, issues of local government autonomy, institutional and constitutional challenges among others. First, revenue allocation has increasingly generated the most tension in Nigeria's IGR where "federally collected revenue forms a greater bulk of state governments' total revenue" (Bambose, 1998: 129). The sensitive and controversial nature of this fact has not only been buttressed by the number of bodies and commissions setup to address the issue but most importantly by the rent-seeking nature of the Nigerian economy.

Among the revenue sharing principles that had been suggested and operated amid largely competitive components with various agenda include population, derivation, need, even development, absorptive capacity, fiscal efficiency, independent revenue and tax effort, national minimum standard for national integration, equality of access to development opportunity, among others. Yet arriving at a collectively agreed revenue sharing formula has remained a major challenge in Nigeria.

A second challenge of IGR is the relative omni-potency of the federal government. This has been captured as over-concentration of powers in the federal government in which case revenue allocation is determined by the federal government and its agencies while also claiming ownership and control of all petroleum products (a major source of the country's revenue) under or upon any land in Nigeria through the petroleum Decree (No. 51) of 1969. In fact, Benjamin (2001: Preface) had described this situation as "over-concentration of power and resources in the Federal Government." Thus, the continuous top-to-bottom approach of Nigerian federalism has continued to have implications for IGR in which case the federal government have continued to exercise control over all other component actors of IGR while often directing the pattern of IGR.

Third, the Nigerian constitution and the crisis of constitutionalism have individually and collectively further reinforced a number of challenges in Nigeria's IGR. It must be pointed out that though no constitution is perfect, the 1999 Constitution has left some loopholes chief of which is its dialectical recognition of local government as a level of government and its failure to add its unquestionable area of jurisdiction. Similarly, it gives over 66 responsibilities to the federal governments alone. In addition, while the state governors are considered to be chief security officers of their states, the various commissioners of police are appointed from, and ultimately answerable to, the federal government as represented by the Police Service Commission.

Fourthly, there is also the challenge of local government as an actor in IGRs. Unlike in South Africa where the move has been

towards inculcating the grassroots level of government as a major players in IGR (Layman, 2003), local governments in Nigeria has tended to represent an external office of the state governments. Thus, as noted by Okon Eminue, a local government as a distinct third tier of government is a myth. Eminue (1995) posited that during military rule, and in spite of the 1976 Local Government Reform which officially recognised them as a third level of governmental activities, had cautioned against labelling local governments as the third tier of government maintaining at that time that they were still under the domination of the state governments who could divert their funds, hijack their functions or funds, dissolve them at will, cease funds, remove elected chairmen or decide not to conduct elections, create substitutes for local government areas or outrightly erase them. This pattern of state-local government relations have however not changed in the Fourth Republic.

The influence of the military in the drafting of the 1999 constitution is so obtrusive such that the model of IGR in that constitution fluctuates between Inclusive Authority Model and Overlapping Authority Model. According to Ikpe (2003,6), while there is evidently the traditional division of powers between the federal government and the component states, the overall power sharing process tends to give the federal government hegemonic dominance over the other components with the local governments being abjectly subordinated to the other two tiers.

In spite of the fact that the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria not only acknowledged the presence of LGs as against what was obtainable in the 1963 and 1979 Constitutions respectively, the 1999 compact proceeded to list the 774 LGs in Part One of the First Schedule of the Constitution yet some states still create their own local governments (or local development areas as in Lagos) different from the previously existing ones but most of the state governments determine the survival and removal of the elected Chairpersons in councils while some state governments refuse to conduct elections into the councils. It must also be said that the attempt by the local governments Chairpersons, through the

Association of Local Government of Nigeria (ALGON), to seek for a four year tenure like their counterparts at the state and federal level were squashed by the decision of the Supreme Court leaving the chairpersons to crawl back to their state governments (Aiyede, 2004: 37).

Fifthly, there is an institutional challenge which speaks to the capacity of institutions to engage and solve conflicts in IGR. By institutions, it refers to the courts, national assembly, among others. The institutional challenges with Nigeria's IGR is not that it does not have identified institutions, but rather these institutions have themselves been engulfed in the systemic challenges of ethnicity, over-centralised centre, corruption, and constitutionalism, among others. This in itself has therefore corrupted, or corrupts, their capacity to function. With this reduced capacity, when there is conflict in IGR, it becomes difficult to resolve especially when one or all of the leaders of the various levels disregard democratic principles or disrespects the decisions of the courts. Meanwhile, in spite of the fact that they are the closest to the grass root, ALGON is not represented at the highest level of IGR.

Conclusion

The conclusion of this paper is in two-fold: a summary and recommendations. This paper posits that arms and levels of government will continue to interact with one another in the process of performing their constitutional responsibilities and functions. Thus, as long as Nigeria operates a federal system of government the levels and arms of government will continue to interact. But as pointed out in the body of this paper, IGR, especially its instrumentalist conceptualisation, has continued to be affected by the individual, group and system level challenges. Building on an instrumentalist IGR presupposes a number of actions among which include creation of more all-encompassing inter-governmental forums that will inculcate the local governments. To do this, there must be a clearer constitutional provision of their roles and

jurisdiction. There must also be the empowerment of institutions like the courts to adjudicate conflict. Most importantly, there is a need to review the fiscal and redistribution powers of the Federal Government powers. This will provide a realistic starting point for an instrumentalist IGR.

Endnotes

Abubakar Oladeji identifies these pattern of IGR transactions to include: federal-state, federal-local, federal-civic groups, state-state, state-local, state-civic groups, local-local, local-civic groups, inter-civic groups (Oladeji, 2005: 19). Though Nyemutu Roberts (1999: 60) maintains that a complete analysis of IGR in a federal system must cover at least six sets of relations: central-state, central-state-local, central-local, state-local, state-state, and local-local.

The Dillon's Rule is derived from the written decision of Judge John F. Dillon in 1868 and it maintains that power is distributed from the states to the local government. As such, local government derives its powers only as allowed by the state.

This is based on the argument that it was the 1914 amalgamation that created the Nigerian state and therefore hitherto existing communities, loyalties or ethnic groupings had existed separately and independently. This is not however saying that there were no arms or levels of government in pre-colonial Nigeria.

Another example of mutual suspicion within the region was manifested when the Western Premier, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, had suggested that the Federal Government nationalise some aspects of the economy, Dr. M. I. Opara had publicly denounced Awo's plot labelling him "a communist who did not have the courage to declare it" (Adefuye, 1992: 35).

Sir Sydney Phillipson's Commission of 1946, Hicks-Phillipson's Commission of 1951, Sir Louis Chick's Commission of 1953, Raisman's Commission of 1958, Binns Commission of 1965, The Dina's Committee of 1968, Aboyade Technical Committee of 1977, among others.

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